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EXIT OF THE DOCTRINE OF SITUS.
A decision rendered by the Supreme Court
of the United States on the 8th day of last
May seems to mark the elimination of the
doctrine of situs as a jurisdictional question
in garnishment and attachment proceedings
in the United States. Justices Harlan and
Day dissented, and yet there is little danger
that the question will again be opened ; and
in view of the conclusion reached, all lovers
of plain, simple justice will rejoice that at last
that disturber of peace and worker of iniquity
in the commercial world has been deprived of
its power to make the honest debtor pay twice
while aiding the dishonest one to escape making any payment at all. Especially will the
writers on the subject who have seen and lamented the evils of the doctrine rejoice in this
happy conclusion of the whole matter. From
this point of vantage it is interesting to review the rise and progress of this doctrine,
and to contemplate the position in which we
now find ourselves. The idea that a debt, a
mere obligation to pay, is a thing fixed in
space, capable of being seised and held in
pawn with a certain and ascertainable location,
may not be a modern invention; but it never
received any judicial sanction except in the
United States, so far as we are able to ascertain. The notion would seem tobe a harmless one in itself; and most men would say-it
is a matter of no importance how it might be
determined, any more than the question as to
how many angels could stand on the point of
a pin., The lifficulty appears when the unfortunate debtor is summoned in two courts
at the same time or successively to answer
for the same debt, and each court refuses to
recognize the proceedings in the other as any
defense, and each compels him to pay to it in
full, on the ground that the debt is there and
not in the other court.
A number of questions entirely apart from
the one as to whether a debt is a thing that
can be located in space, in other words has a
situs, have been involved in the judicial and
extrajudicial discussions of this question; and
it is more tnan probable that the doctrine had
its inception in some of these. A few may
be mentioned, and the most prominent one is
this: Is it just to a stranger found transiently
here and guilty of no wrong, to compel him
to stay on expense and defend a lawsuit to
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help some other stranger, or even resident, to
collect a bad bill? Clearly this is a question of
right and not of power. Yet it is believed the
doctrine sprung from this situation. Again,
what is a sufficient personal service on a foreign corporation to justify a personal judgment against it as garnishee? This is very
often bound up with the discussions as tc situs.
One of the oldest doctrines of the English
law was that the case must be tried by a jury
of the vicinage; and in its beginning this
principle was induced by the old jury system,
by which the jury was composed of the witnesses of the fact, and based their finding on
their own knowledge rather than on testimony
given before them. Under such a system a
debt would have to be sued where it was incurred or created. But when the jury came
to pass on testimony rather than give judgment on their own knowledge, this objection
was soon obviated by alleging a fictitious
venue, a subterfuge which the courts sanctioned, in so much that they would not permit
Anissue to be taken on the allegation.'
other objection sometimes raised with questions of situs is that the courts are supported
by taxes on the locality, and that it is unjust
to the people of the place to increase the
expense by entertaining litigation between
persons all of whom are foreigners and nonresidents casually meeting there.
The doctrine that a debt has a locality for
the purpose of garnishment finds negative
support in the decision in Andrews v. Clerke
(1689),2 cited by Mr. Waples in his monograph on "Debtor and Creditor-Situs of
Debt," and afterwards quoted in full in C.,
R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Sturm (1898),3 in
which the garnishee pleaded to the jurisdiction
that the debt for which he was summoned
arose outside of the jurisdiction of the court ;
and the court, holding the plea bad, said:
"It was always the custom in London to attach debts upon bills of exchange and goldsmiths' notes, etc., if the goldsmith who gave
the note on the person to whom the bill is
directed liveth within the city, without any
respect had to the place where the debt was
contracted,"which might seem to indicate that
1 Parker v.Crook, 10 Modern, 255; Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowper, 161, 1 Smith's Leading Cases, *340.
'2 1 Carthew, 25, 1 Shower, 10. The decision was by
Holt, C. J.
8 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797, Rood's Attach.
Gar., etc., 71.
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the residence of the garnishee is important.
But while rummaging the old lumber pile for
another purpose, I discovered a still older
decision, proving that the residence of the
garnishee was not deemed important. In
Mollam v. Hern (1668), 4 the garnishee objected that the court had no jurisdiction of
the debt because he resided out of the city.
But the court said: "The debt follows the
person, and it is therefore called a foreign
attachment, because let the debt arise where
it will, it is attachable if the debtor cometh,
or the money be brought into London." ' ,
As the notion found no support in the English courts, we must look for the origin of
the doctrine in the American decisions. A
case often cited in these discussions, and believed to be one of the first, if not, indeed,
the very first in which any color of this doctrine is found, is the case of Tingley v. Bateman (1813),6 in which all parties were residents of Rhode Island, trustee process
(garnishment) was sued in Massachusetts,
the officer returned that he could not find the
principal defendant, and the court dismissed
the action, saying: "The summoning of a
trustee is like a process in rem. A chose in
action is thereby arrested, and made to answer the debt of lhe principal. The person
entitled by the contract or duty of the supposed trustee, is thus summoned by the arrest
of this species of the effects. These are,
however, to be considered for this purpose as
local, and as remaining at the residence of
the debtor or person intrusted for the principal; and his rights in this re-pect are not to
be considered as following the person of the
debtor to any place where he may be
transiently found, to be there taken at the
will of a third person, within a jurisdiction
where neither the original creditor nor debtor
4 2 Kibble, 320.
See also Harrington v. Macmorris, 1 Marshall, 333,
5 Taunton, 228, and note to Tarbill's Case, 1 Win.
Saunders, 67. Frumpton v. Pettis(in C. P. 1680), 3 Lev.

23, sometimes cited to the contrary, is not in point,
and though clearly wrong, it merely holds that if the
debt sued for by the principal creditor was contracted
and payable out of London, the payment under the
garnishment was no defense for the garnishee to the
action by his own creditor. In Huxham v. Smith
(1809), 2 Camp. 19, cited by Mr. Saunders, ubi supra,
to show that the garnishee must be resident and the
money payable in London, such an objection was
wnade by counsel, but the payment under the garnishment was held a good defense.
6 10 Mass. 343.

No. 14

resides. * * * In the case at bar, the
principal has not been made a party by any
legal summons. * * * As this defect of
service appears in the proceedings, the court
dismissed the action ex ofcio."' 7 In later
cases this decision was followed though the
defendant, a nonresident, appears to have
been served with process within the state.8
7 Followed where the defendant was served by
leaving an attested copy of t4e writ at his last place
of abode, and by order of the trial court notice was
personally served on the defendant in another state.
Nye v. Liscombe, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 263; Sawyer v.
Thompson, 24N.H. 510; Jones v. Comings, 6 N. H.
497. Also,when the facts were the same exceptthat the
plaintiff resided in Rhode Island and the garnishee
and defendant in New York. Green v. Farmers and
Citizens Bank, 25 Conn. 452. Also, when the plaintiff
is not stated to have been a nonresident, though the
defendant and garnishee were, and the other facts
were the same. Lovejoy v. Albee, 33 Me. 414, 54 Am.
Dec. 630; Central Trust Co. of New York v. Chattanooga R. & C. R. Co., 68 Fed. Rep. 685; Pennsylvania
R. Co. v. Rogers, 52 W. Va. 450, 44 S. E. Rep. 300, 62
L. R. A. 178.
8 Smith v. Eaton, 36 Me. 298, 58 Am. Dec. 746. In a
suit by the judgment creditor againt the garnishee on
thegarnishment judgment, the court said: "The position taken by the defendant is, that the court has
no jurisdiction over the property of the principal defendant in the hands of the supposed trustee, though
the process is properly served on both the principal
defendant and the trustee, because the court, in proceedings of this kind, must have jurisdiction over the
property alleged to be in the hands of the trustee as
well as over the person of the trustee. * * * The
question here is, whether a person who has in his
hands personal property of a debtor for which he
might rightfully be charged as trustee in the courts of
his domicile, can be charged as trustee of the same
property in the courts of any other jurisdiction in
which he and the debtor may be found, and duly
served with process. The general p rinciple is very
clear that debiturn et contraetus sunt nullius loci,debts and obligations are not local. They are incident to
and accompany the person wherever he may be found,
so that, as the general rule, a debtor, or contractor, or
party answerable for personal property, is chargeable
in any place where he is served with process. It is
contended that the case of the trustee process is an
exception to this rule; that it is not enough that a
party is regularly served with process of the court
within the jurisdiction where he is at the time. He
cannot be charged as a trustee except in the jurisdiction where he resides. *
*
*
In general, mere
choses in action are to be considered, with respect
to a suit of this kind, as local, and not as following
the person of the trustee to any place where he may be
transiently found. This decision is placed on the
ground that the courts have jurisdiction in trustee
suits where the trustee is resident in another state,
and that under proper circumstances the trustee may
be charged, though it appears that all the parties
are resident out of the state.
*
*
*
If on
disclosure it appears that the trustee had not, at the
time of the service of the process, any property of the
principal defendant in this state, and was not holden
upon afly debt or contract to be paid or discharged in
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It will be observed that in these cases the
question has been rai-ed in the garnishment
proceedings, not collaterally, but on these
decisions as authority, individuals garnished
and compelled to pay in a state where they
did not reside,u and corporations paying under
garnishments in any state other than the one
of their incorporation, 10 or pleading prior
subsisting garnishments or garnishment judgments against them in any other state, 1 ' have
been compelled to pay again at the suit of
their own creditor in disregard of such
garnishment, on the ground that the garnishment was void for want of jurisdiction of the
res.

It will be observed that in most of the cases
thus far considered, the residence of the garnishee's creditor is not stated as a fact of much
importance, and in many of them is not stated
at all ;.but in another line of cases these have
been cited as authority for a very different
doctrine, that the residence of the creditor or
the place of payment is the important fact,
and the residence of the garnishee of no, or
only incidental, consequence. In these cases
corporations incorporated in other states, and
there Lheld under pending garnishments, or
that have been compelled to pay under them,
have been compelled to pay at the suit of
their creditor in the state of his residence, in
disregard of such garnishment, on the ground
that the garnishment was void for want of
jurisdiction of the res, which was held to be
at the place of payment or at the residence of
this state, he will not be charged; not for wantof
jurisdiction of the case and person and subject-matter, but because the courts here hold that in such case
the trustee is not chargeable, since their judgment
will not affect the title to property out of the state and
consequently the trustee could not be protected by It.
Here there was no disclosure. The trustee was duly
summoned, and had opportunity to show his case, but
did not. Ie thereby admitted the charge of the
writ, andlwas justly charged on his default. If he had
nothing ini his hands it would be no ground for relief
from such judgment. It would not be a stronger case
that he had property for which he ought not to be
charged, and did not show it." Lawrence v. Smith,
45 N. H. 533,86 Am. Dec. 183.
9 Ward v. Boyce, 152 N. Y. 191, 46 N. E. Rep. 180, 36
L. R. A. 549; Balk v. Harris, 124 N. Car. 467, 32 S. E.
Hep. 799, 45 L. R. A. 257, 70 Am. bt. Rep. 606.
10Allen v. United Cigar Stores Co., 80 N. Y. Supp.
401, 39 Misc. Rep. 500.
11 Douglass v. Phenix Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 209,
33 N. E. Rep. 938, 20 L. R. A. 118, 34 Am. St. Rep.
448; Strause v. Etna Ins. Co., 126 N. Car. 223, 35 S. E.
Rep. 481, 48L. R. A. 452; Renter v. Hurlbut, 81 Wis.
24, 50 N. W. Rep. 783, 14 L. R. A. 562, 29 Am. St. Rep.
850.

the creditor.1 2 On the other hand quite as
many courts, if not more, have insisted from
the first, that the debtor may be charged as
garnishee wherever service can be and
ismade on him, regardless of the place of
residence of either himself or his creditor, or
the place of payment or contract. One of
the cases often cited as a leading case of this
class is Embree v. Hanna (1809), 1 3 de12Louisville & N. i. Co. v. Nash, 118 Ala. 477, 23 So.
Rep. 825,41 L. R. A. 331, 72 Am. 6t. Rep. 181, incorporated in both states; Chicago, R. 1. & P. liy. Co. v.
Sturm, 58 Kan. 818 58 Pac. Rep. 1100, affirming same
case in 5 Kan. App. 427, 49 Pac. Rep. 337, and following Missouri 1'. Ry. Co. v. Sbaritt, 43 Kan. 375, 23
P'ac. Rep. 430, 8 L. R. A. 385, 19 Am. St. Rep. 143;
Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 70 Miss. 344, 19 L. R.
A. 577, 35 Am. St. Rep. 651, 12 So. Rep. 461, followed
in Bucy v. Kansas City M. & 1B.Ry. Co. (Miss. St.
Ct. Rep., April, 1896, not officially reported), 22 So.
Rep. 296; American Central Ins. Co. v. Hettler, 37
Neb. 849, 66 N. W. Rep. 111, 40Am. St. Rep. 622, in
which the point was also declared that the judgment
in the other state was void because the debt was not
payable there; Osgood v. Maguire, 61 N. Y. 524; Continental Ins. Co. v. Chase (Dec. 7, 1895, not officially
reported, Tex. Civ. App.), 33 S. W. Rep. 711.
In holding a payment under garnishment in another state no defense the Supreme Court of Alabama
says: "It appears from the admission of counsel that
defendant is a corporation incorporated under tAe
laws of Alabama but running and operating its railroad from Chattanooga, Tenn., through Alabama, to
Meridian, Miss., and that the claim of the plaintiff is
for work done for the company in Alabama; he being
at the time, and still, a resiC'ent of this state. The
power of a state to submit foreign corporations
to the same liabilities and duties imposed on like corporations of the state, including liability to be sued
and served with process in the same manner, is not
questioned. In Banking Co. v. Carr, 76 Ala. 388. it is
said: 'It is well settled, however, that no action it
personan can be maintained against a foreign corporation unless the contract sued on was made, or the injury complained of was suffered in the state in which
the action was brought.' Garnishment is a species
of proceedings in rem, in the nature of a sequestration
of the debtor's effects. Unless the property is within
the jurisdiction of the court issuing the garnish:nent
so that it may be seized, jurisdiction, neither of the
res nor the person, can be acquired.
* 4 * The
case of Railroad Co. v. Kennedy, 83 Ala. 462, 3 So.
Rep. 852, does not conflict with this view. In that
case the garnished corporation, being incorporated in
Tennessee, was domiciled in that state, and was as
much within its jurisdiction for the purpose of being
sued as a natural person, a resident of the state. The
liability of the garnishee was not vailed by the fact
that the corporation operated its railroad 'in Alabama also, and that the debt was contracted
In
this state."
Alabama
G. S.
R.
Co. v.
Chumboy, 92 Ala. 317, 9 So. Rep. 286.
135 Johns. 101. Chancellor Kent (then Chief
Justice), who wrote the opinion in this case said:
"Nothing can be more clearly just, than that
a person who has been compelled, by a competent jurisdiction, to pay a debt once, should
not be compelled to pay it over again.
It has
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cided by the New York Supreme Court,
per Kent, C. J. Hanna, resident in Baltimore, Md., was arrested in New York
at the
suit of
Embree, resident iii
New York, and pleaded in abatement that
he had been summoned as garnishee of
Embree in a suit still pending against him in
Baltimore, and this was held to be a good
defense to the action. It is true that in this
case the garnishee resided in the place where
he was summoned, but this point has not been
considered important in all the subsequent
cases, and there are a great many in which
the same doctrine has been declared.
With the courts thus clashing against each
other, and making the tormented garnishee
pay at both ends, the conflict became vexed,
sometimes acrimonious, and unfortunately
frequent. Business men, and especially coraccordingly, been a settled and acknowledged principle, in the English courts, that where a debt
has been recovered of the debtor under this process
of foreign attachment, in any English Colony, or in
these United States, the recovery is a protection, in
England, to the garnishee against his original creditor, and he may plead itinbar. * * * Thecreditor
ought not to lose his debt when he has had no opportunity to defend himself, and the debtor ought not to
pay a second time a debt which he has been obliged
to pay once, under the process of a competent court;
but the case of the creditor would not be so hopeless
as that of the debtor, for he might probably resort to
the person who sued out the attachment, and call
upon him to make good his demand, or to refund the
money, which the law might well presume he had received for the use of the creditor of the garnishee.
This was the principle of the decision in Philips v.
Hunter, 2 H. Ill. 402. Admitting the cases to stand
equal in equity (and the claim of the debtor to protection who has been obliged to pay once, must be admitted to be at least equal in equity), the interest of
the defendant ought to be preferred. If then the de-

fendant would have been protected under a recovery
had by virtue of the attachment, and could have
pleaded such recovery in bar, the same principle
would support a plea in abatement of an attachment
pending, and commenced prior to the present suit.

The attachment of the debt in the hands of the defendant, fixed it there, In favor of the attaching cred-

itors; the defendant could not afterwards lawfully
pay it over to the plaintiff. The attaching creditors
acquired a lien upon the debt, binding upon the de-

fendant; and which the courts of all other governments, if they recognized such proceedings at all,

cannot fail to regard:

*

* * If we were to disallow

a plea in abatement of the pending attachment, the
defendant would be left without protection and be

obliged to pay the money twice; for we may reasonably presume that if the priority of the attachment in
Maryland be ascertained, the courts in that state
would not suffer that proceeding to be defeated, by
the subsequent act of the defendant going abroad, and

subjecting himself to a suit and recovery here."
Embree v. Hanna, 5 Johns. 101.

No. 14

porations engaged in interstate commerce,
on whom the burden fell most heavily, began
looking anxiously for some escape. During
this period many decisions were recorded
containing extended and very learned discussions of the whole subject. Pre-eminent
amongst these may be mentioned National Fire
Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 1 4 and 'Missouri Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Sharitt.15 The first relief came in
1898, on the publication of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Chicago, R. . & P. Ry. Co. v.
Sturm. 6 That court reversed the decision of
the Supreme Court of Kansas, in which a
man working and living in Kansas, where lie
was hired and usually paid, and where as
a householder or head of a family he was entitled to exemption of his wages from garnishment, was given judgment for the amount
due him, although the garnishee defended on
the grotnd that it had been summoned and
judgment rendered against it as his garnishee
in a court of Iowa, where it was incorporated.

This case established that if a natural person
or corporation is made garnishee in the state
of his or its domicile, the provision of the
United States constitution requiring that full
faith and credit slmall be given in each state to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state, requires that
such garnishment shall be recognized as a
defense in every other state, to any action
against the garnishee by his creditor, regard-

less of where such creditor resides, where the
contract was made, where the money was
payable or earned, or whether it was or was
not exempt from garnishment, etc., by the law
of the creditor's domicile or elsewhere. At
first, many hailed this decision as the solution of the whole difficulty; but very soon it
was discovered that the end was not yet.
Immediately cases arose in which the garnishee was a corporation of some state or
sovereignty other than that in which it was
made a garnishee; and it was argued and held
that the decision in the Sturm case extended
only to cases in whieh the garnishee was in1453 N. J. Eq. 468, 32 Atl. Rep. 663; Dwyer's Cases
on International Law.
15 43 Kan. 375, 23 Pac. Rep. 430, 8 L. R. A. 885, 19
Am. St. Rep. 143, in which the court was divided and
three judges filed opinions.
Is174 U. S. 710, 43 L. Ed. 1144, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797;
Rood's Attach. Gar. etc. 71.
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or of the creation of the debt, that fact is imcorporated in the state where garnished,
material. If it be meant that the obligation
if the garnishee wag a natural person only to
garnishments in the state where he resided, to pay the debt can only be enforced at the
place thus fixed, we think it plainly untrue.
and, therefore, that garnishment elsewhere
was without jurisdiction, and no defense to a The obligation of the debtor to pay his debt
subsequent suit by the garnishee's own credi- clings to him and accompanies him wherever
lie goes. He is as much bound to pay his
tor.18 Now this contention has been settled.
debt in a foreign state when therein sued
It has jtist been held in a case in the Supreme
Court of the United States that the decision upon his obligation by his creditor, as lie
in the Sturm case is not to be given the limited
was in the state where the debt was contracted. We speak of ordinary debts, such
construction contended for. In Harris v.
as the one in this case. It would be no deBalk, '1 coming from the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, both parties resided in that fense to such a suit for the debtor to plead
state and Balk sued Harris for money loaned
that he was only in the foreign state casually or temporarily. His obligation to pay
on verbal promise to pay. Harris pleaded in
would be the same whether he was there in
defense that just a few days before the suit
that way or to remain. It is nothing but the
was begun, while Harris was temporarily in
Baltimore, Md., he was summoned as garni- obligation to pay which is garnished or atshee of Balk, returned without making de- tached. This obligation can be enforced by
fense, and on the day this suit was com- the courts of the foreign state after personal
menced made affidavit of indebtedness to Balk, service of process therein, just as well as by
on which his counsel in Baltimore consented the courts of the domicile of the debtor."
to judgment being rendered against him, on
In parts of the opinion the court may seem
such garnishment, which he afterwards paid.
to make the question of jurisdiction to deThe North Carolina courts held that this pend on the right of the garnishee's creditor
garnishment in Baltimore was without juris- to sue him there. But it is believed that
diction, because the garnishee, was a non- when the question comes to test the court
resident, he and his creditor both residing in
should and will hold that the jurisdiction deNorth Carolina, where the debt was con- pends on sufficient service on the garnishee in
tracted and payable. This decision is now
a state and under a law authorizing garnishreversed, so that now it is settled that it is ment proceedings and in a court authorized
not material that the principal debtor and by such law to entertain garnishment suits.
garnishee are both nonresidents, the debt con- In other words, if a garnishee is summoned
tracted and payable elsewhere, and in a state on a demand and judgment rendered against
by the laws of which it would be exempt from him when he ought to have been discharged,
garnishment. As a matter of comity, no that judgment is merely erroneous, and is no
doubt, no state would entertain a suit prose- more void for want of jurisdiction than if a
cuted to evade the exemption laws of another
similar judgment had been rendered against
state, if the fact is discovered ; but that is a him at the suit of his own creditor. In a
matter for the court to decide and not a word, the whole question on a garnishment
matter of jurisdiction, which cannot be ac- set up as a defense, so far as jurisdiction is
quired by holding it to exist.
concerned, will be this: 1. Had the court
In the course of his opinion, Mr. Justice that charged the garnishee acquired jurisdicPeckham, speaking for the majority of the tion over him, so it could render a judgment
court, says:
"We do not see the materi- inpersonam against him? 2. Was there an
ality of the expression 'situs of the debt,'
law of the itate authorizing garnishment prowhen used in connection with attachment
ceedings? As towhether that law was com proceedings. If by situs is meant the place plied with and extended to the case in hand,
it seems to me, are questions exclusively for
17National Bank v. Furtick (Del.), 2 Marvel, 35, 42
the court trying the case to decide, and the
Atil. Rep. 479, 69 Am. St. Rep. 99, 44 L. R. A. 216.
18 Balk v. Harris, 122 N. Car. 64, 45 L. R. A. 257, 80 correctness of its conclusions on these ques20
S. E. Rep. 818, 124 N. Car. 467, 45 L. R. A. 260, 70 Am.
tions ought not to be reviewed collaterally.
St. Rep. 606, 32 S. E. Rep. 799, 130 N. Car. 881, 41 S.
20 These views find sanction in the learned opinion
E. Rep. 940, 132 N. Car. 10, 43 S. E. Rep. 477.
of the court In Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 53 N
19U. S. S. C. (May 8, 1905), 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625.

J. Eq. 468, 82 AtI. Rep. 663.
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In the conclusion of the opinion the court
holds that the garnishee summoned and
charged in a proceeding in which his creditor
is not served or notified, can take no advantage of such garnishment and payment as a
defense to the action of his own creditor,
unless he notified his creditor so that he had
opportunity to defend it. But in this case
it was held that the plea made was sufficient
notice, though made after judgment by confession had been taken against the garnishee,
since the law under which the garnishment

was had, permitted the'principal debtor to defend and have restitution at any time within
a year after judgment, if he could show his
right, and required a bond of the garnishing
creditor to secure the defendant's rights.
It is believed that this decision is eminently
sound and wise, will serve as a protection
against repetition )finjustices that have often
been done, and is a fit cause for general rejoicing.
JOHN

R.

ROOD.

University of Michigan.

COMMERCE IN INTOXICATING

LIQUORS

VALIDITY OF STATE INSPECTION LAW.
PABST BREWING COMPANY v. G. Y. CRENSHAW.
United States Supreme Court, April17, 1905.

An inspection law enacted by a state "in the exercise of its police powers," within the meaning of the
Wilson Act of August 8,1890, subjecting to laws so
enacted all intoxicating liquors arriving in the state,
is not void as an interference with interstate commerce
because it operates to deter shipments into the state.
Interstate commerce in intoxicating liquors is not
unlawfully burdened by an inspection law enacted by
a state "in the exercise of its police powers,"within the
meaning of the Wilson Act of August 8,1890, subjecting to laws so enacted intoxicating liquors arriving in
the state, because the statute does not provide for an
adequate inspection, and imposes a burden beyond
the cost of inspection.
Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the
court:
The Pabst Brewing Company, a Wisconsin corporation, filed its bill in the court below to enjoin the beer inspector of the s'ate of Missouri
and his assistant from collecting, or attempting
to collect, an inspection charge, fee, license, or
burden, which it was alleged the law of Missouri
imposed upon beer or other malt liquors when
shipped from other state3 into Missouri, after its
delivery within that state to the consignee, and
when held for sale for consumption in Missouri

No. 14

or for shipment to other states. The general
ground upon which the law was assailed was
that the exactions complained of were regulations of commerce repugnant to the constitution
of the United States. It was, in addition,
specially averred that, so far as the law imposed
a charge on beer shipped from Wisconsin into
Mlssouri, and held there by the consignee for
sale and shipment for consumption in other
states, the Missouri law was repugnant to the
commerce clause, because in this particular it
discriminated in favor of beer manufactured in
Missouri and held for sale or shipment for consumption in other states.
The bill was amended and demurred to. Whilst
the court considered the law not to be In conflict
with the commerce clause on the general grounds
alleged, it nevertheless concluded, because of
the averment concerning discrimination as to
beer shipped into Missouri for reshipment to
other states, that the demurrer could not be sustained.
120 Fed. Rep. 144.
An answer was
thereupon filed, as also a replication, and subsequently the cause was submitted upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts. The Supreme Court of Missouri having decided that the
law in question did not provide for any charge or
burden upon beer or other malt liquors shipped
into Missouri and held there for reshipment to
points outside of the state, the court below, adhering to its previous opinion as to the general
averments of the bill, and applying the construction given by the supreme court of the state to
the statute, held that it did not discriminate, and
dismissed the suit.
The law of Missouri in question is entitled -An
Act Creating the Otl-e of Inspector of Beer and
Malt Liquors of the State, and Providing for the
Inspection of Beer and Malt Liquors Manufactured
and Sold in this State." The provisions of the
act essential to be considered may be summarized
as follows:
It creates the office of beer inspector, to be appointed by the governor, who shall be an expert
beer brewer, and who is required to furnish a
be)nd, and is given power to appoint the necessary
deputies to execute the provisions of the act.
The act forbids every person or corporation engaged in brewing within the state from using any
material or chemical in the manufacttire of beer
or other malt liquors other than pure hops or
pure extract of hops, or barley, malt, or wholesome yeast or rice. It is provided that the inspector or his deputies shall keep a roecord of
those engaged in the manufacture, brewing, and
sale of malt liquors within the state, and of the
quantity manufactured or sold, and shall make a
full report to the governor concerning the same,
and imposes upon the officials named the duty of
inspecting all beer or other malt liquors manufac.ured or sold within the state, to see that they
conform to the standard of purity which the law
requires. The act further imposes an inspection
fee, charge, or license, acceompanied with pro-
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